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ABSTRACT

The paper discusses and analyzes negotiations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO nations to reduce military forces in Central Europe. These negotations have taken place in Vienna since 1973. Material is organized in three major sections. Section I offers a general survey of the political and strategic context within which the negotiations have taken place. Information in this section illustrates how external events have had a dramatic impact on the negotiations. These external events include agreement on the Salt II Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union in June 1979, the decision of the NATO ministers to modernize NATO's nuclear force, and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979. Information is also presented on competing objectives of the NATO and Warsaw Pact participants, which have sometimes hindered negotiations. For example, whereas each side wishes, on the one hand, to stabilize the military balance at the conventional level in Central Europe, each side also wishes to increase the limitations on the military forces of the other side. Section II focuses on major issues of the negotiations, with emphasis on changes in positions that were made by both sides from the opening of the negotiations through 1979. In the final section, several conclusions regarding the relationship between East-West detente and bargaining within the Vienna force negotiations are offered, including that there was a significant trend from 1973 to 1979 for detente to fade and for conflict to increase: in external events, the behaviors of the two alliances tended to mirror one another in an action-reaction pattern: and within the Vienna negotiations there were few strong patterns of mutual reciprocity. A content analysis of verbatim transcripts and a summary quantitative analysis of interactions between parties in the negotiations conclude the paper. (DB)

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DÉTENTE AND THE EUROPEAN FORCE REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS

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I. BACKGROUND TO THE VIENNA FORCE REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS

Since 1973 the Warsaw Pact and NATO alliances have been negotiating on the reduction of military forces in Central Europe. This negotiation developed as a central part of the effort to strengthen East-West détente with the European context, and the specific arms control measures were largely intended to contribute to a strengthening of the détente process in Europe. This mutual relationship was stated clearly by Polish Ambassador Strulak in a press conference on December 12, 1974:

> We certainly draw our inspiration from the continuing process of détente in the world and in Europe, from the efforts to make it irreversible. Just as our negotiations are determined by this process and so we are encouraged with its every advancement, so also we do realize the importance for this process of any progress we may register here in Vienna.

After more than seven years of negotiation, however, these talks have produced mixed progress, but they have failed to produce any concrete agreement between the parties. At the same time that these negotiations have floundered, so has the détente process on both a global level and within the European context. Therefore, it is possible that the deterioration of détente may have also created obstacles for agreement within the Vienna talks. and that the concomitant failure to reach agreement in Vienna may have contributed as well to the reversal of the détente process. The essential objective of this paper is to determine, therefore, how these two processes have been interrelated during the period from October 1973, when negotiations opened in Vienna, through the end of 1979.

The paper begins with a general survey of the broad political and strategic context within which the Vienna negotiations, known as the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in the West, took place. It then turns to an examination of the different and common objectives of NATO and Warsaw Pact participants in these negotiations, which lie behind the different positions taken by these parties within the negotiations. Finally, it outlines the major issues of the talks, emphasizing the changes in positions that were made by both sides during the period from the opening of the negotiations through 1979.

The second section of the paper then turns to a quantitative analysis of the interactions between the détente process and the Vienna negotiations. A content analysis of the verbatim transcripts at the beginning and end of each round of the Vienna talks is made to determine when each party established or modified its position on all of the issues under dispute. This provides a summary quantitative index of forward movement and stalemate (or even backsliding) by the parties in these negotiations. In addition, an events data process is employed to measure the degree of conflict and cooperation in the overall interactions between NATO and Warsaw Pact participants outside these negotiations during this same period. This makes it possible to relate changes in external events with the taking of positions within the Vienna negotiations in order to determine whether or not these two processes are reinforcing one another, and, if so, what direction this relationship takes. This will then enable us to explore the interrelationships between changes in the overall state of East-West détente and progress or stalemate within the Vienna negotiations.

A. THE POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS

Since 1973 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact have been negotiating in an attempt to limit their military forces in Central Europe. These negotiations, which have taken place in Vienna, have thus far been unsuccessful in reaching a concrete agreement. In spite of considerable progress which had been achieved by the end of 1979, a number of external events have had a dramatic impact on these negotiations. Foremost among these external factors were the agreement on the SALT II Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union in June 1979, the decision by

NATO ministers meeting in Brussels in December 1979 to "modernize" NATO'S theatre nuclear forces, and finally the Soviet decision to send large numbers of troops into Afghanistan in late December 1979.

The negotiations on mutual force reductions in Central Europe opened in Vienna on October 30, 1973. In these negotiations members of the two major military alliances of the post-World War II period, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, have sought to reduce their military forces in a delimited area of Central Europe including the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The central objectives of these negotiations are to establish a stable military balance in Central Europe, to limit rising defense costs for all participants, and to reinforce the process of political détente between these two alliances. At present many Western analysts have argued that the signature of SALT II, which was intended to preserve a state of approximate parity in Soviet and American strategic nuclear forces, made the world more susceptible to instabilities resulting from potential imbalances at the regional level, especially in Europe. Here attention has focused on several questions.

First, the conventional military balance in Central Europe has generally been considered in the West to favor the Warsaw Pact. In this region Warsaw Pact forces are widely believed to have an almost 2 1/2 to 1 advantage in main battle tanks, with the Warsaw Pact possessing about 16,200 tanks in comparison with about 6,700 in NATO forces. In ground manpower, the Warsaw Pact is believed to have an edge of more than 150,000 men relative to NATO forces in the Central European area covered by the Vienna negotiations. Although some of these advantages are offset by a qualitative superiority on

NATO's side and by significant advantages in defensive weapons such as precision-guided anti-tank weapons, the major deterrent to an attack by Eastern conventional forces has been the advantage of about 2 to 1 which has generally been assumed to exist in NATO's favor in tactical nuclear weapons. If war were to break out in Central Europe, however, this situation could present NATO with a serious dilemma. If the conventional force imbalance were to give an initial advantage to the Warsaw Pact forces, NATO might be confronted with a choice between acquiescing in military gains by the socialist states or initiating the use of tactical nuclear weapons, with all of the related dangers of escalation. Obviously neither alternative is very attractive.

A second problem has appeared with regard to the balance of Euro-strategic forces (generally referred to in the United States as theatre nuclear forces). In this area, concern has grown recently that the development of new Soviet nuclear delivery vehicles directed against European targets has presented a new threat to the stability of the balance in Europe. Soviet deployments of about 120 medium range SS-20 missiles and about 50 "Backfire" bombers in the European theatre have generated considerable concern, especially since these numbers are widely expected to increase to about 200 SS-20's and 100 Backfires by the mid-1980's. At the same time NATO "Forward Based Systems," composed of 56 British Vulcan bombers and 170 American F-111 bombers, are considered to be increasingly less reliable, due both to their vulnerability to a first strike by the new Soviet weapons and their questionable ability to penetrate Soviet air space effectively in the event of a war.

The Soviet Union has argued that their new deployments merely represent a modernization of existing forces rather than the introduction of qualitative-

ly new arms in the region. They contend, furthermore, that these forces merely offset NATO's "Forward Based Systems." In spite of the different perceptions about the present status of the strategic balance in Central Europe, there can be little doubt that the USSR has made more significant improvements in this area in recent years than has NATO. The major question, therefore, is whether this simply made up for past inferiority or whether it created a new superiority of forces favoring the Eastern side. Since the latter is widely perceived to the case in the West, this issue also caused considerable concern in NATO countries about the military balance in Europe at a time when SALT II, if ratified, would have frozen the overall Soviet-American strategic balance in a position of approximate quantitative parity.

Therefore, for some time concern has grown in the West about the balance of military forces in Europe at the conventional level, the tactical nuclear level, and the theatre nuclear level. Even if some overall balance does exist across all of these forces, there is little doubt that there are imbalances among subsystems within this overall balance. Furthermore, these subsystemic imbalances could contribute to the escalation of any conflict which might break out in Europe. For example, it is possible to conceive of a scenario in which initial Warsaw Pact advantages in conventional forces might be offset by NATO's advantages in tactical nuclear weapons, forcing the Warsaw Pact to initiate use of its theatre nuclear weapons. There are two broad ways for NATO to respond to this dilemma.

The first is to upgrade NATO forces in Western Europe. In the conventional area, the Long Term Defense Programme adopted by NATO during its Washington summit in May 1978 took some steps in this direction by calling

for increases in the defense budgets of all NATO countries by 3% per year. Similarly, NATO ministers meeting in Brussels in December 1979, agreed to a series of measures designed to modernize NATO's theatre nuclear weapons. Specifically NATO decided to begin production and to prepare for the deployment in about 1983 of 108 Pershing II missiles with a range of about 2000 kilometers and 464 Tomahawk ground-launched Cruise missiles with a range of about 2500 kilometers. Both missiles would thus be capable of reaching the Soviet Union from bases to be located in West Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and perhaps the Netherlands and Belgium.

While this approach may temporarily improve Western perceptions of balance in Europe in both conventional and theatre nuclear weapons, it could also set off renewed arms races in both of these areas. There is no assurance that the Soviet Union and its allies would acquiesce in these moves without upgrading further their own forces. Soviet conventional forces in Eastern Europe clearly serve several functions. In addition to defending the socialist countries against possible attacks from the West, they also help to maintain the political cohesion of the Eastern European bloc. Therefore, Soviet actions, which may be perceived by Western analysts to indicate a drive for military superiority, may be perceived by the Soviets as absolutely essential for maintaining their position in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, Soviet deployments of systems such as the SS-20 and Backfire may be intended in part to serve as "bargaining chips" to get NATO to negotiate over its "Forward Based Systems," which heretofore have not been discussed in either SALT or the Vienna negotiations. Whatever Soviet motives may be, it is likely that NATO force increases in Western Europe will be countered by additional Soviet deployments, thus probably setting off a new arms race in Europe.

It is largely for this reason that many European members of NATO, believing that détente and defense are compatible objectives, have argued for new arms control initiatives as a logical complement to the decision to deploy new theatre nuclear weapons. Indeed, the Netherlands has made such efforts a necessary prerequisite for accepting new weapons on their territory. Specifically, they insisted upon ratification of SALT II by the U.S. Senate and the commencement of SALT III negotiations on Eurostrategic weapons before they would agree formally to accept new weapons on their territory. Although other NATO countries did not insist on such specific prerequisites, it is clear paradoxically that the failure of new arms control initiatives would lead to growing domestic opposition to the modernization of NATO forces and perhaps to a growing interest in these countries in moving towards greater independence from American foreign policy. Such a movement would clearly be very harmful to the cohesion of the North Atlantic alliance.

The second, and not necessarily mutually exclusive, alternative for addressing the problem of the military balance in Europe is through arms control designed to enhance not only the overall military balance but also the balance at various force levels within the overarching balance. Heretofore, Eurostrategic weapons have not been discussed in any ongoing East-West arms control negotiations. However, the NATO ministers in their December 1979 meeting in Brussels proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union place the issue of European theatre nuclear weapons high on the agenda for SALT III negotiations. Although the United States would consult extensively with its NATO allies about these negotiations, both France and Great Britain were adamant that these negotiations take place within the context of SALT to assure that only Soviet and American, rather

than British and French, Eurostrategic weapons would be discussed. The NATO ministers clearly hoped that these negotiations might successfully limit these weapons prior to the actual deployment of NATO's new missiles, in the hopes that either the number could be reduced or that the deployment could be headed off altogether.

All of these plans were further complicated, however, by the entrance of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in December 1979. In retaliation for this action, American President Carter asked the US Senate not to begin debate on the ratification of the SALT II Treaty, and it is probable that the ratification of SALT II will be postponed indefinitely by the Reagan Administration. It is unlikely that SALT III negotiations could begin in such a hostile environment. This may leave NATO with an unattractive choice between postponing their deployment of new theatre nuclear forces, an unlikely choice in the presence of a deteriorating political climate, and proceeding with the deployment without making a serious effort to reach arms control agreements in advance. The latter course could stimulate a regional arms race and greatly complicate any arms control negotiations which might ensue after the deployments had already taken place. It could also engender political opposition to this decision in many NATO countries, which could seriously disrupt the cohesion of the Western alliance.

B. THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF MBFR

Therefore, for the past and possibly even for the immediate future the main focus on arms control in Europe seems to reside with the Vienna negotiations. To date these negotiations have dealt almost entirely with military manpower in Central Europe, with some additional consideration of the

most threatening armaments on each side, namely Soviet tanks and American tactical nuclear weapons. As previously noted, these negotiations grew out of a concern for the stability of the military balance and the overall preoccupation with security issues in Central Europe, which have been a major focus for East-West relations throughout the postwar period. Central to this problem has been the tension surrounding the division of Germany and the special status of Berlin, as well as the mounting level of armed force present in all parts of this region. Proposals for arms control in Central Europe date back at least to the 1955 Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference, when the three Western participants proposed the creation of a demilitarized zone between Eastern and Western Europe as part of a plan for the reunification of Germany under free elections. Coming immediately after the rearmament of West Germany and its entry into NATO, this proposal was not well received by the Soviet Union. Approximately two years later, however, Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki proposed the creation of a nuclear free zone in Central Europe along with a nonaggression pact. This proposal was rejected by the West on the grounds that it tended to perpetuate the division of Germany and thus did not provide an adequate political basis for the security of Central Europe. Consistently over the next 15 years the fundamental disagreement between East and West over the status of German reunification and Berlin proved to be an obstacle to any serious negotiation about the European security issues. Thus some solution, even a partial one, to the German problem became virtually a necessary political prerequisite to negotiations on arms control in Central Europe.

Such a partial solution began to develop in the late 1960's when the Federal Republic of Germany under the leadership of Willy Brandt and

the socialist states of Eastern Europe negotiated a series of agreements improving the overall political climate in Central Europe. In 1970, a treaty between the FRG and the Soviet Union renounced the use of force in mutual relations. It also recognized the present frontiers of Europe, including the Oder-Neisse line as the border between the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Poland as well as the previously existing border between the two parts of divided Germany. This was followed in 1971 by a treaty between the FRG and Poland reaffirming the Oder-Neisse line, a boundary which the West Germans had adamantly refused to accept in the past. Later in 1971, the Four Powers which had occupied Berlin since the end of World War II signed a treaty regularizing access from West Germany to Berlin and creating a special relationship between the city of West Berlin and the FRG. Finally, in November 1972, the two Germanies signed a treaty opening the way to normalized relations. Thus, although permanent solutions were not found to the problems of Germany and Berlin, these problems were regulated sufficiently so that they no longer posed an insuperable obstacle to serious arms control negotiations in the region. No longer could the West insist on the reunification of Germany, which had been put off indefinitely by the series of agreements, as a precondition for any negotiations. No longer could tensions over access routes between the FRG and Berlin and other such issues provide an immediate threat of open warfare in Central Europe. Furthermore, the FRG and the GDR could now negotiate directly with one another without fear of granting one another de facto recognition.

The interest in force reductions had been revived several years before these treaties dealing with the German problem were signed.

Following the presentation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting in 1967 of a report by Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, the NATO Ministers decided to propose force reduction talks with the Warsaw Pact. In March 1969, following armed clashes between Soviet and Chinese forces on their common border, the Warsaw Pact's Consultative Committee met in Budapest and proposed convening a general conference to consider questions of European security and peaceful cooperation. For some time thereafter, the Warsaw Pact promoted negotiations on general security issues in Europe, whereas NATO insisted on a more restricted negotiation dealing with concrete force reductions. At the summit meeting between U.S. President Nixon and Soviet First Secretary Brezhnev in May 1972, these differences were compromised in an agreement to hold separate but parallel negotiations in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and on force reductions in Central Europe (known in the West as MBFR or the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction negotiations.)

The CSCE negotiations took place over three years from 1973 through 1975, culminating in a summit meeting in Helsinki on August 1, 1975, when the Final Act was signed by 35 states. This document was divided into three broad sections, the first of which dealt with issues of European security. This section contained a set of ten principles to guide political relations among the states of Europe, including the non-use of force, the territorial integrity of states, non-intervention in internal affairs, respect for human rights, and the fulfillment of international obligations. It also included a set of confidence building measures (CBM's) intended to promote advanced notification of large-scale military maneuvers and the

exchange of observers at such maneuvers. Thus the CSCE was primarily intended to establish the political basis for détente in Europe, accompanied by some modest measures to reduce tensions and especially fears of surprise attack. However, most specific military measures were treated within the context of the bloc-to-bloc negotiations on force reductions which began in Vienna on October 30, 1973.

When the Vienna negotiations opened, NATO and the Warsaw Pact took somewhat different positions regarding the major issues under discussion. These different proposals reflected somewhat different objectives of the two groups of states.

Perhaps the principal objective of the NATO participants in Vienna was to establish a more stable military balance at the conventional level in Central Europe. As noted previously, NATO participants were concerned about the instabilities which might arise from a situation in which, according to NATO data, the Warsaw Pact has an advantage of about 150,000 men on the ground (about 932,000 Warsaw Pact ground soldiers compared to about 782,000 for NATO) and of about 9,500 main battle tanks (16,200 for the Warsaw Pact in contrast to 6,700 for NATO). These military imbalances might not only increase the likelihood that conflicts would escalate, but fears of such escalation also might provide the socialist countries with great political advantage in any political disputes in Central Europe even prior to the outbreak of hostilities, since this military advantage might be accompanied by an enhanced bargaining position for the Warsaw Pact countries. Thus NATO sought to stabilize this particularly important source of imbalance to forestall any negative political or military consequences which might flow from it.

A related NATO objective was to provide for the orderly reduction of American troops in Western Europe, in exchange for a reciprocal reduction of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. This would respond to domestic pressures within the United States to reduce overseas military expenditures at a time when the U.S. dollar was weakening on international monetary markets and the American balance of payments was becoming increasingly negative. These negotiations might enable such withdrawals to be made without requiring any significant increases in the force levels of Western European members of the NATO alliance. Furthermore, the corresponding withdrawal of Soviet forces would reduce those forces in Eastern Europe which are perceived in the West to be the most threatening. This would have the concomitant advantage from the Western point of view of reducing Soviet political influence, reinforced by its military persence, on the socialist states of Eastern Europe.

A major objective of the Warsaw Pact in these negotiations, by contrast, was to obtain limitations on the military forces of the states of Western Europe, especially the FRG. The longlived historical memories of German militarism in Eastern Europe have reinforced the desire on the part of these states to see that West Germany does not become a major military power in its own right. At present the FRG supplies about 50% of the ground and air manpower for the NATO forces in the region covered by these negotiations. The Warsaw Pact nations thus wanted to assure themselves that any reductions in American forces in Western Europe would not be compensated by increases in the forces of the FRG. One of the consequences of the growing Soviet-American détente was a shared outlook between the two superpowers about some central aspects of their relationship. Thus the Warsaw Pact states generally perceived

American behavior as more predictable than that of their Western European allies, and they tended to view the American presence in Western Europe as a restraining counterweight to West German dominance of NATO. A goal of special importance in the eyes of the Warsaw Pact states was to prohibit the FRG from gaining any direct access to nuclear weapons or more vehicles for their delivery.

In addition to this objective, the Warsaw Pact was alsc interested in limiting those armaments in which NATO was perceived to have an advantage. Of particular interest here were tactical nuclear weapons, where NATO is generally believed to have a quantitative advantage of about 7000 to 3500 relative to the Warsaw Pact. Also the Eastern nations wanted to limit those armaments where NATO was perceived to hold a qualitative edge.

Finally, the Warsaw Pact nations were concerned about the high costs of defense and especially the high potential costs involved in the continuation of a conventional arms race in Central Europe. In particular, the desire on the part of the Soviet Union to increase its military forces on its border with the Chinese Peoples' Republic reinforced their interest in conventional armaments reductions in Central Europe. Thus an agreement which could offset spiralling defense costs would be in the interest of all parties in these negotiations.

C. MAJOR ISSUES IN THE VIENNA FORCE REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS, 1973-79.

The specific agreements proposed at the outset of the Vienna talks by both sets of states reflected largely these differences in objectives. Specifically, the Warsaw Pact proposed that force reductions should take

place on the basis of equal percentage reductions of the manpower and armaments of all states having forces in the region. These reductions would take place over three phases, and all states individually would be required to reduce in all three phases on an equal percentage basis. Furthermore, these reductions would be across-the-board, including all manpower and armaments stationed in the region. The NATO proposal, on the other hand, called for a reduction by both countries of their ground manpower only down to a common and equal ceiling for the forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the region. Furthermore, this would be a collective ceiling applying to an entire alliance as a whole rather than to individual nations. In the NATO proposal, the reductions would be made in two phases, with the United States and the Soviet Union taking their reductions in the first phase and the other participating nations undertaking reductions in a second phase. Finally, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact called for a series of agreements on associated measures, such as enhanced confidence building measures, provision for the verification of the agreement, and assurances that an agreement would not endanger the security of other nonparticipating states in Europe.

In short, these negotiations have focused on five main sets of issues throughout their duration. On most of these issues the positions of the two alliances have changed substantially throughout the negotiations.

The first major issue involved the method for calculating reductions. The original NATO proposal called for a common ceiling of 700,000 ground manpower for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the reductions area. The main thrust of this proposal, of course, was to reduce a major category of military force in which NATO perceived that the Warsaw Pact held a significant

numerical advantage. Thus the NATO proposal would have required, according to NATO's data, far greater reductions in the ground manpower of Warsaw Pact forces than of NATO forces. NATO spokesmen argued that such an outcome was necessary in order to restore a conventional military balance in Central Europe and to reduce the dangers of an escalating conflict. In December 1975, NATO modified their proposal slightly to include air manpower in the overall ceiling, bringing the new ceiling to 900,000 men, with a subceiling on ground personnel at 700,000. Thus the main emphasis of the NATO position on this question was upon obtaining a manpower parity in the region.

The Warsaw Pact's position on this first issue was that reductions should be made through equal percentage reductions of the forces of both sides in the region. The result of their proposal would be to preserve the pre-existing military balance in the region at lower levels, amounting to a reduction in the end of about 17% of the forces of each side. The Warsaw Pact contended that the present balance in Central Europe was stable, as evidenced by the absence of war in the region since 1945. Therefore, the Vienna negotiations should seek to maintain the present balance at lower force levels. However, on June 8, 1978, the Warsaw Pact made a major concession in which they accepted the principle of equal common ceilings for manpower, with a combined air and ground manpower ceiling at 900,000 and a subceiling of 700,000 ground troops. At this point the two sides were in agreement in principle on this issue.

There were serious remaining difficulties, however, for the implementation of this agreed principle. The Warsaw Pact argued that reaching the common ceiling would require reductions of NATO ground forces by about

91,000 men (based on official NATO data of 791,000 ground forces presently in the reduction zone) and reductions of 105,000 Warsaw Pact ground troops (based on official Warsaw Pact data indicating the presence of 805,000 men in the area). While the Warsaw Pact argued that the disparity of ground forces in Central Europe amounted to only about 14,000 men, NATO contended that the Eastern states had about 940,000 troops in the region creating a disparity of about 150,000 men. These NATO data indicate that the Warsaw Pact would have to reduce about 240,000 troops to reach the common ceiling. Thus, according to NATO figures the Warsaw Pact would have to reduce its forces by almost 2½ times as many men as the Eastern states agreed to reduce. This difference remains as a major obstacle to agreement in Vienna. NATO is unwilling to accept an agreement which might codify a major advantage for the Warsaw Pact in manpower size, while the Warsaw Pact insists that their data are an accurate reflection of the size of their forces in the region. Thus major attention in the negotiations since 1977 has been devoted to an effort to resolve these different estimates of force levels in Central Europe.

A second major issue in the Vienna negotiations involves the scope of reductions. The original NATO proposal called for reductions of only ground troops plus one Soviet tank army with about 1700 main battle tanks. NATO reductions would be taken through force thin out, whereas the Soviet Union would have to take the entire tank army out of the region as a single unit. NATO argued that these reductions addressed the most serious disparities in Central Europe, establishing greater equality. Furthermore, they argued that reductions in armaments would greatly complicate the negotiations and subsequent verification of an agreement, especially for armaments like aircraft which could move in and

out of the region quickly. In December 1975, NATO modified its position somewhat by introducing its so-called "option three" proposal which had been held in reserve since the opening of the negotiations. In this proposal the United States would withdraw about 1000 tactical nuclear weapons plus 54 nuclear-capable F-4 aircraft and 36 Pershing surface-to-surface missile launchers. In exchange, the Warsaw Pact would have to accept the collective, common ceiling, plus agree to withdraw a tank army of 1700 tanks. NATO spokesmen stressed that this was a "one time only" offer designed to meet major Warsaw Pact concerns about asymmetries in tactical nuclear weapons. Thus reductions of American and Soviet armaments would take place only in those systems where the greatest imbalances exist. One final modification of NATO's proposal was made in April 1978. At that time NATO responded to Warsaw Pact criticism by agreeing to reductions in Soviet tank forces on the basis of five separate tank divisions amounting to 1700 tanks, to be taken from any locations within the reduction zone. Thus it would no longer be necessary for the Soviets to withdraw one entire tank army from the GDR, but rather these withdrawals could be accomplished through a thin out, division by division. The United States also agreed at that time to take some of its reductions in units rather than through a general thin out of forces.

The original position of the Warsaw Pact called for across-the-board reductions, including all categories of military equipment and manpower. The same percentage figures would be applied to all types of forces, including manpower, aircraft, artillery, nuclear weapons, tanks, and all other armaments. Thus the overall "correlation of forces" between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would be unaffected by the agreement, and the present balance would be maintained at lower levels. Furthermore, there would be

restrictions against the deployment of new categories of weapons in the region. Finally, all of these reductions would apply equally to all parties. In this case, it was particularly important to the Warsaw Pact that European states, not just the United States and the Soviet Union, undertake armaments reduction as part of an agreement.

On June 8, 1979, the Warsaw Pact dramatically modified its position on this issue. For the United States and the Soviet Union they proposed selective armaments reductions of the type proposed by NATO. The NATO proposal for American reductions was accepted, and they proposed that the USSR reduce the equivalent of three tank divisions, including 1000 tanks and 250 mechanized infantry combat vehicles equipped with anti-tank rockets and anti-aircraft capabilities. Residual levels would also be established over all Soviet and American armaments, so that withdrawn forces could not be replaced with new categories of weapons. The Warsaw Pact also dropped its demand at that time for across-the-board armaments reductions by participants other than the United States and the Soviet Union. Instead they argued that the European states might also reduce their armaments selectively, following the model of the United States and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, they insisted in contrast to the NATO proposal that the European participants undertake specific armaments reductions as part of an agreement. Here their special concern was with the forces of the FRG, especially armaments in their possession capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The Warsaw Pact, however, has not been very specific about the precise nature of these reductions to be taken by the non-US and non-USSR participants.

Subsequent events, however, called into question the tentative consensus reached previously on this issue. On October 6, 1979, Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev, speaking in East Berlin, offerred to withdraw unilaterally up to 20,000 men and 1000 main battle tanks from East Germany into the USSR. This came at least part way to meeting the basic provisions suggested by NATO in its "option three" proposals of 1975, and the number of tanks mentioned corresponded exactly to the number offerred by the Soviets in their counterproposal presented in the Vienna negotiations in June 1978.

At the December 1979 NATO ministerial meeting, the United States announced that it would withdraw 1000 tactical nuclear warheads unilaterally from West Germany. In addition, any new theatre nuclear weapons to be deployed after 1980 would replace older warheads which would be withdrawn as well, so that NATO's modernized nuclear force would possess 1000 fewer warheads than the present level, totalling about 7000. This move was clearly designed to soften the impact of the force modernization decision on the Soviets. However, since it meant in effect that the major component of the NATO "option three" offer would be accomplished by the United States unilaterally, for all practical purposes this armaments reduction proposal was withdrawn from the Vienna negotiations. Therefore, any further discussion of armaments reductions is not likely to take place in the Vienna talks in the immediate future.

A third issue of disagreement involved whether or not the force ceilings, however defined, should apply collectively to entire alliances or specifically to individual nations. NATO argued that the ceiling should be collective. In particular, NATO countries, especially the FRG, were

concerned that some member nations might be forced by domestic pressues to reduce their forces below their "appropriate share." In that case, other members of the alliance would have to compensate for these extra reductions, which they could not do if they were restricted by national ceilings. Thus, NATO argued that each alliance should be free to determine internally the makeup of its force structure, so long as the overall ceiling was not exceeded. Furthermore, they contended that national ceilings might become an obstacle to any future integration of Western European forces as an outcome of greater political integration within the European community. Thus NATO wanted to avoid giving the socialist states any droit de regard over its own internal defense structure.

The Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, favored specific national ceilings on forces. Here their principal concern involved limiting the forces of the FRG, which they feared could grow significantly under a collective ceiling provision. Therefore, their insistence on national ceilings was clearly directed at limiting the size of West German forces within the NATO alliance. Once again, however, the Warsaw Pact introduced a partial compromise on this issue on June 8, 1978. At that time they announced that they accepted the principal of collective ceilings, with several qualifications. There would be no specific limits on the size of national forces; however, initial reductions should be roughly proportional to the size of national units within the reductions area. Nations could increase their forces subsequently to compensate for excessive reductions by their allies, with three caveats. First, no single nation would be allowed to make up more than 50% of the shortfall. Second, no single country could have more forces after the agreement took effect than they had beforehand. Third, there

could be no increase in the number of civilians employed in military support positions, in order to insure that reductions were not taken by converting positions from military to civilian incumbents. In addition, the Warsaw Pact proposed limitations on the number of formations and military units in the reductions area, as well as restricitons on the reorganization of existing military units. Although units could be relocated within the region, they could not be drastically altered in terms of their organizational role or function.

These proposals were largely rejected by the NATO countries. The restrictions placed on the principle of collective ceilings, according to NATO spokesmen, amounted to de facto national ceilings. Both the idea that initial reductions would be roughly proportional to the size of national forces and the provision that no country could maintain a larger army after the agreement than before amounted in effect to national ceilings according to NATO. Thus substantial disagreement about this issue remains. In particular, the German problem remains at the heart of this disagreement, since the Warsaw Pact clearly seeks to use these provisions to limit the armed forces of the FRG. In return, the FRG is very much opposed to any specific limit on its own role within the NATO alliance.

Further compromises appeared on this issue in 1979. The Warsaw Pact, in a proposal submitted in April 1979 argued that it was only necessary that initial reductions by all participants would have to be "approximately proportional" to present force sizes. This approximate proportionality was defined as falling within about 3 or 4 percent, plus or minus. NATO continued to reject any reference to "proportionality" on the grounds that this implied de facto national ceilings. In its reply to this offer, how-

ever, NATO sought to assure the Warsaw Pact that all states participating in the reductions would take "significant" cuts in their force levels, without defining that term precisely. In the end it is likely that this would amount in practice to approximate and perhaps even to exact proportionality, even though NATO opposed formalizing that likely outcome in the agreement. However, by the end of 1979 the differences on this issue appeared to be largely semantic.

A fourth major issue involves the phasing of reductions. The original position of NATO was for reductions to be made in two phases. First, 68,000 Soviet and 30,000 American forces would be withdrawn, while all other participants would not reduce until phase two. For NATO this provided a way for the United States to relieve quickly domestic pressure for American reductions, while at the same time obtaining reductions from the major military forces of the Warsaw Pact. This had the further effect of creating a national subceiling on Soviet forces, the largest in the East, without having to accept a national ceiling on forces of the FRG, the most numerous in the West. NATO modified its position on phasing in a series of proposals for the Vienna negotiations following the NATO ministerial meeting in December 1979. These included the following: First, there would be a modified phase one troop reduction, consisting of the withdrawal of 30,000 Soviet troops from the region and 13,000 American troops. These reductions would only amount to about 44% of the phase one reduction previously agreed upon. Second, the initial agreement would include only broad outlines for a phase two reduction, including the goal of a common, collective ceiling as previously agreed upon. Further assurances would be provided that all

participating states would make "significant" contributions to the phase two reductions.

The opening position of the Warsaw Pact on the phasing question was that reductions ought to take place over three separate and distinct phases. In the first phase, each side would reduce 20,000 men and their arms. In the second phase each nation would reduce its forces by 5%, with a 10% reduction coming in the third phase. Furthermore, the Warsaw Pact insisted upon agreement by all direct participants about the specific nature of their future commitments to reduce before any actual reductions would be made. This argument seemed largely to reflect the desire of the Warsaw Pact to assure that any reductions of Soviet forces in the East would be accompanied by comparable diminution of the forces of the West German Bundeswehr. The Warsaw Pact compromised on this issue, however, in February 1976. At that time they agreed to only two phases, with the first composed solely of Soviet and American forces. They insisted, however, that phase two reductions be agreed to in advance, prior to the execution of phase one. They also insisted that it include specific commitments to reduce by all other participants. In June 1978, the Warsaw Pact agreed to a more general kind of commitment by non-US and non-USSR participants to reduce in phase two, acknowledging that the details could be worked out while phase one reductions were going into effect. However, they insisted that if direct participants refused to abide by these commitments in phase two, then the entire agreement would be rendered invalid.

The fifth set of issues within the Vienna negotiations involve "associated measures," a general term used to describe a wide range of supporting provisions necessary to make an agreement effective. Many of these measures had been discussed only informally, if at all, in the negotiations prior to the end of 1979.

However, at the 1979 NATO ministerial meeting a series of "associated measures" were proposed, designed to enhance mutual confidence and to facilitate the verification of other aspects of the agreement. This would include the prenotification of all military activities outside of normal garrisions by units of one division or more, including maneuvers and largescale troop movements. Each side would have the right to send observers to these activities. They also suggested that each side would give prior notification of movements of ground forces of the direct participants into and out of the reductions area. These movements would take place through fixed entry/exit points where observers from each side would be stationed. In addition, there would be exchanges of information about the personnel strength and organization of forces left in the area, with a provision for a specified number of annual inspections from the ground, the air, or from both to assure that force levels did not exceed the established ceilings. These provisions would thus build upon and strengthen, in a contractually binding agreement, the "confidence building measures" established on a voluntary basis in the 1975 Helsinki accords. It would also set up a continuing consultative mechanism to promote the implementation of the provisions of the agreement. There was no Warsaw Pact reaction to these proposals by the end of 1979.

In addition to these proposals NATO insisted on certain non-circumvention provisions, namely measures to assure that gains made through an agreement are not somehow offset by actions of the parties which might in other ways destabilize the political and military situation in Central Europe. Thus, for example, NATO wants to insure that forces withdrawn from Central Europe are not deployed on the northern or southern flanks of Europe. NATO had at one time also insisted on provisions to insure that troops would not be stationed in Hungary which might offset any

reductions in the central area. However, when it became apparent that the Warsaw Pact would insist on reciprocal limitations on Italy or other Western European states, this proposal was quietly dropped by NATO.

II. A DESIGN FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

In order to explore the relationship between the changing positions within the Vienna negotiations and the nature of East-West relations in Europe, procedures were developed for measuring quantitatively the changes in each of these dimensions of behavior.

First, in order to measure changes within the Vienna negotiations, a procedure called Bargaining Process Analysis[1] was employed to content analyze the press conferences held by NATO and Warsaw Pact spokesmen at the end of the first 19 rounds. There was one round held in the fall of 1973, and subsequently three rounds were held each year through 1979. Since the negotiations are held under a confidentiality rule, it is impossible to obtain texts of the actual negotiations; therefore, the press conferences are the only public summary of the major events of each round. However, the author has held numerous interviews from 1975-1979 with negotiators in Vienna, and the information provided in these press conferences was often interpreted in the light of additional information gained through these individual interviews.

In these press conferences any changes in position or strategic manipulations designed to influence position change were recorded. Eight categories were established and weighted according to their approximate importance in leading towards agreement or in creating stalemates

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[1]Charles Walcott and P. Terrence Hopmann, "Interaction Analysis and Bargaining Behavior," in Robert T. Golembiewski (ed.), The Small Group in Political Science: The Last Two Decades of Development (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1978.

These categories are defined as follows:

A) Positive position changes (convergence):

1) Initiation of new proposals: weight = +3

2) Accommodation or concession to a position favored by the other side: weight = +10

3) Acceptance of an initiation or accommodation presented by the other side: weight = +6

4) Promises of contingent reward or removal of a punishment: weight = +6

B) Negative position changes (divergence or stalemate):

1) Commitments to positions: weight = -3

2) Retractions of previous initiation or accommodations: weight = -10

3) Rejection of an initiation or accommodation presented by the other side: weight = -6

4) Threats of contingent punishments or removal of a reward: weight = -6

Thus the content analysis procedure yielded weighted totals of these position changes based upon a summation of positive and negative changes for each of the first 19 rounds of the Vienna negotiation. This made it possible to chart the progress of the negotiations towards agreement or coversely tendencies towards stalemate or even movement away from agreement from the opening of the talks in October 1973 through December 1979. A summary of these codings is found in Appendix A.

The second set of factors to be analyzed involved the external behaviors of Warsaw Pact and NATO nations towards one another during this same time period. In this case an "events data" procedure was employed to scale

major events between members of these two alliances (France, as a nonparticipant in Vienna, was excluded from NATO for these purposes) from September 1, 1973 through December 31, 1979. These events were scaled along a 30-point continuum ranging from intense conflict (30) to high levels of cooperation (1)[2]. A total of 1,751 such events were identified from Keesing's Contemporary Archives, a major chronology of international events. All events were rated by three graduate student judges.[3] A highly significant composite intercoder reliability of .870 was reached, and the scores of the three judges were averaged to compute a composite rating for each event. The data were then broken down into nineteen periods of four months each, cooresponding roughly to each of the 19 rounds of Vienna negotiations. Thus each year was broken into four-month periods, including January through April, May through August, and September through December; in all cases each round of the Vienna negoitations was contained completely within one of these periods. Thus scores on this conflict and cooperation continuum were obtained for each period for each of the following sets of nations:

1) All NATO (except France) to the Warsaw Pact
2) The United States to the Warsaw Pact (except USSR)
3) Western European NATO nations plus Canada to the Warsaw Pact (except USSR)
4) The United States to the Soviet Union
5) The Warsaw Pact to all NATO (except France)

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[2]Lincoln E. Moses, Richard A. Brody, Ole R. Holsti, Joseph B. Kadane, and Jeffrey S. Milstein, "Scaling Data on Inter-Nation Action," Science, No. 156, May 26, 1967.

[3]Data for 1979 have been analyzed only in a preliminary fashion by two coders, and full reliability checks on these data are not complete as of this writing.

6) The Soviet Union to NATO (except France)

7) Eastern European Warsaw Pact nations to NATO (except France)

8) The Soviet Union to the United States.

The data for all of these variables, including the mean and standard deviation over the 19 rounds, plus the correlation of each item with time, are summarized in Table 1. All subsequent analyses are based on these raw data.

III. THE QUANTITATIVE RESULTS: THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AND EAST-WEST CONFLICT AND COOPERATION, 1973-1979

The purpose of this section is to evaluate the quantitative data that have been collected in search for the nature of the relationship between external events in East-West relations from 1973 through 1979 and the negotiating behavior of NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations in Vienna. First, it is useful to examine some of the general trends that appeared in the data over these 19 periods.

Looking initially at the Vienna negotiations, no significant trends were evident in the behavior of either NATO or the Warsaw Pact. Both sets of nations had slightly positive trends, but in both cases these were also very weak. The mean behavior charge for both blocs was also close to zero, thus indicating a relative absence of significant progress. This is not to say that there was no progress in these negotiations. For the Warsaw Pact, significant forward moves were made in both rounds 4 (fall of 1974) and especially in round 15 (summer of 1978). For NATO, significant forward steps were taken also in round 4, as well as round 7 (fall of 1975), round 14 (spring of 1978), and round 19 (fall of 1979). However, on the average these forward moves were offset by many more periods of stalemate or regression

in these negotiations, which contributed to the absence of any significant positive trends in the negotiations when the period is examined in its entirety.

While there were no significant trends in the taking and changing of positions within the Vienna negotiations, there were significant trends in most of the indicators of the external events. In this instance, the data reveal a very significant pattern of increasing conflict between the NATO and Warsaw Pact nations throughout these negotiations. NATO's overall behavior towards the Warsaw Pact became significantly more conflictual over these 19 periods ($r=.60$, $p=.003$), as did the Warsaw Pact's behavior towards NATO ($r=.54$, $p=.009$). Thus the overall inter-alliance relationship during these 76 months was characterized by a serious decline in the level of détente. This significant increase in conflict was especially evident in the Soviet-American relationship, and also in Western European behaviors towards both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Interestingly, there was no significant increase in Eastern European (excluding the Soviet Union) conflict with either the United States or Western Europe, nor was there a statistically significant increase in Soviet conflict with Western Europe. Thus, the non-Soviet Eastern European countries seemed to be maintaining at least some level of détente, and the Soviets also clearly did not increase their conflict as greatly with Western Europe as they did with the United States. Finally, it is interesting to note that American behavior towards Eastern Europe actually became slightly (though insignificantly in a statistical sense) more cooperative towards Eastern Europe during these negotiations. Thus the principal focus for increasing conflict was in the Soviet-American relationship, while Eastern Europe remained largely insulated from these worsening events. Similarly, the mean values for each of these dyads

indicates that the average conflict was somewhat greater in US-USSR interactions over the entire period than it was in any of the interactions involving the European nations. In summary, détente has declined for both alliances as a whole, but this has been far more pronounced in superpower relations on the continent of Europe.

The data reported in Table 2 treat the correlations among the various nations participating in the Vienna negotiations in their external interactions with one another. These data may help to answer two interesting questions. First, to what degree was there substantial responsiveness between these two major alliances in overall interactions outside the negotiations? Second, were the various members of the two alliances behaving in a fashion similar to their other allies?

The first question concerning reciprocity is interesting because it enables one to evaluate the degree to which East-West cooperation and conflict follow an interactive dynamic, with each side responding to the behavior of the other side. In general, the data strongly indicate that such a responsiveness characterized East-West relations during the period from September 1973 through the end of December 1979. The correlation between NATO actions towards the Warsaw Pact and the latter's behavior towards the former was highly significant ($r=.89$, $p<.001$). Similarly, high reciprocity characterized the US-USSR dyad ($r=.76$, $p<.001$) and the Eastern and Western European interactions ($r=.61$, $p=.003$). Thus, in virtually all respects, these data indicate that changes in overall East-West relations were mutually responsive, with changes in the level of détente exhibited in the foreign policy of one set of nations being mirrored in the responses of their "cold war" opponents.

The second question based on data from Table 2 concerns the inter-alliance relationships. In this case, some interesting inconsistencies were found. For example, American behavior towards the Soviet Union was only weakly correlated with Western European behavior ($r=.26$, $p=.15$), and American and Western European behaviors towards the nations of Eastern Europe (excluding the USSR) were weakly negatively related ($r=-.11$, $p=.33$). Thus these data suggest that the United States and its Western European allies pursued rather unrelated policies towards the Warsaw Pact countries throughout much of this period. Perhaps even more surprising, there is virtually no correlation between the behaviors of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries towards their major antagonist, the United States ($r=-.02$, $p=.47$). By contrast, the USSR and their Eastern European allies seemed to be somewhat more coordinated in their actions towards the Western European members of NATO ($r=.64$, $p=.002$). Overall, however, these data certainly would tend to suggest some different orientations towards détente (or more correctly towards a resumption of "cold war" policies) between the two superpowers and their allies in Europe. These data are consistent with the verbal proclamations by major leaders in both Western and Eastern European leaders of their desire to insulate European détente from the shocks of deteriorating superpower relationships, suggesting that they have thus far been at least partially successful in this endeavor.

Next we turn to the data summarized in Table 3 to consider the reciprocity between the two alliances within the Vienna negotiations. This table presents the correlations between the negotiating behaviors of these two alliances. Considerable literature on international negotiations has suggested that high levels of reciprocity may be conducive to reaching

successful oucomes, especially if the negotiating nations can become locked into a cycle of "tit-for-tat" concessions moving towards agreement.[4]

The results reported in Table 3 for all 19 periods indicate a weak negative correlation between NATO and Warsaw Pact negotiators in the Vienna negotiations (r=-.19, p=.22). However, an examination of lagged correlations reveals a significant, though not very strong, relationship between NATO behaviors in one time period and the negotiating actions of the Warsaw Pact in the ensuing round (r=.37, p=.07). Thus there is some indication that the Warsaw Pact seems to be following the behavior of NATO in the previous round, though no similar trend was found for NATO responsiveness to actions by the Warsaw Pact. Of course, the absence of any strong simultaneous or one-period lag correlations does not demonstrate the total absence of responsiveness in these negotiations. The complex decision-making processes for the Vienna negotiations, both at the national level and at the alliance level, may make responses tend to lag at quite different rates, varying from one round on some issues to up to several years on other issues. Nevertheless, it is evident that there is not a clear pattern of simultaneous or almost simultaneous responsiveness within these negotiations,

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[4]This point is suggested strongly in much experimental literature on negotiations, especially the work of Warner Wilson, "Reciprocation and Other Techniques for Inducing Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma Case," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 15, 1971; this point is also suggested in a study of Soviet-American interactions in the partial nuclear test ban negotiations by P. Terrance Hopmann and Theresa C. Smith, "An Application of a Richardson Process Model: Soviet-American Interactions in the Test Ban Negotiations, 1962-63," in I. William Zartman (ed.), The Negotiation Process: Theories and Applications (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage, 1978).

which may contribute to their slow pace if not necessarily to their failure to produce agreed results.

However, we also decided to break these negotiations into two parts in order to take account of the changing state of East-West détente. An examination of the raw data revealed that the East-West relationship began to deteriorate in early 1976, shortly after the successful completion of the agreement eminating from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Indeed, through the end of 1975 our data reveal an increasing trend towards cooperation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in their overall interactions. The correlation between time and cooperative NATO behaviors was fairly strong ($r=.64$, $p=.06$), as it was also for Warsaw Pact actions towards the West ($r=.68$, $p=.05$). This contrasts notably with the general decrease in cooperation over the full 19 periods.

The data reported in Table 3 indicate that this change was also reflected in the relationship between the positions of the two parties within the Vienna negotiations. In the first seven rounds, NATO and Warsaw Pact behaviors in Vienna were highly correlated ($r=.88$, $p=.004$), whereas their relationship became significantly inverse ($r=-.48$, $p=.06$) in the next 12 rounds of the negotiations. Thus the Vienna negotiations changed from a pattern of strong mutual responsivenes in their first 2-1/2 years, to movement that seemed to be considerably out of phase in the four years of 1976-1979. However, in this case, we did find a significant positive relationship for the latter four years in which Warsaw Pact behavior was modeled closely after NATO behavior in the preceding round of the negotiations ($r=.68$, $p=.008$). So there appeared to be some delayed responsiveness by the Warsaw Pact to change of position by NATO within the Vienna force reduction talks.

We may now turn to the central focus of this paper which concerns the relationship between the Vienna negotiations and the political context within which they took place. Table 4 summarizes the correlations between the positions of the NATO alliance in the force reduction talks and the data on external relations. The relationship between the behavior of the NATO countries to the Warsaw Pact within and outside negotiations was only weakly positive. Only in the case of US behavior towards Europe was there a significantly positive relation ($r=.34$, $p=.09$). On the other hand, NATO's bargaining position within the Vienna negotiations seemed to be significantly related to the external behavior of the Warsaw Pact countries towards it. Most importantly, overall actions by the Warsaw Pact towards NATO countries outside the negotiations were positively related to NATO actions back towards the Warsaw Pact within the negotiations ($r=.44$, $p=.03$). This overall finding was also supported in the case of Soviet actions towards the United States ($r=.33$, $p=.08$) and Eastern European behaviors towards Western Europe ($r=.43$, $p=.03$).

Once again when the data are divided between rounds 7 and 8, some further explanation for these weak findings is presented. Here we find that there was a very substantial correlation between external events and NATO's behavior within Vienna in the first seven rounds. In particular, NATO's behavior within the negotiations was consistent with its overall actions outside negotiations ($r=.90$, $p=.003$) and was highly responsive to overall Warsaw Pact actions towards NATO ($r=.91$, $p=.002$). However, there were no significant positive relationships between external events and NATO's behavior in Vienna in rounds 8 through 19. Thus the negotiations seemed to have changed from a highly structured exercise in the period of détente, to

one characterized by far more random, unrelated actions in the periods when détente began to deteriorate.

As noted previously, NATO's behavior for all 19 rounds appeared considerably more responsive to the behavior of the Warsaw Pact outside negotiations than to their behavior within negotiations. This point is further demonstrated in Table 5 by a multiple regression analysis which seeks to determine the impact on NATO's Vienna behavior of three independent variables: 1) the behavior of the Warsaw Pact toward NATO in Vienna, 2) the behavior of the Warsaw Pact towards NATO in overall events, and 3) the behavior of NATO towards the Warsaw Pact in overall events. This equation results in a multiple R of .68 ($p=.02$), with the most significant contribution to the equation being made by the external behavior of the Warsaw Pact towards NATO followed by the external behavior of NATO to the Warsaw Pact. Thus NATO appeared to be responding less to Warsaw Pact actions in Vienna than to the overall pattern of interactions, especially to the overall trends in Warsaw Pact actions towards the West outside of these negotiations. Given the strong trend towards growing conflict in these external events, it appears likely that this relationship tended to contribute more to stalemate in Vienna rather than to forward progress.

The data presented in Table 6 are parallel to those presented in Table 4 except that they apply to the behavior in Vienna of the Warsaw Pact. Here the relationships for all 19 periods are generally weaker than for NATO and also are frequently in the opposite direction. Thus the East's behavior in Vienna was negatively associated withits external behavior towards NATO ($r=-.32$, $p=.09$), and similar results pertain as well when Soviet behavior towards the United States and when Eastern European actions

towards Western Europe are examined. Similarly, the Warsaw Pact generally responded in a negative way to NATO's actions towards them outside negotiations ($r=-.29$, $p=.11$), although the only such relationship to reach significance was in the case of US actions towards the USSR ($r=-.46$, $p=.03$). Thus, in general the Warsaw Pact tended to become slightly more cooperative in Vienna when conflict increased in overall relationships, and less cooperative when détente was more prevalent in interbloc relations. However, most of these relationships were not very strong.

Once again the data have also been broken down into two subperiods, and in the case of the Warsaw Pact an even more dramatic reversal in relationships is revealed. The absence of significant relationships for the overall period covered over significantly opposing relationships for the two subperiods. Again, periods 1 through 7 were characterized by very strong positive relationships between external events and Warsaw Pact behavior in Vienna. In a fashion highly parallel to NATO, the Warsaw Pact behaved in Vienna in a manner quite consistent with its external behavior through the end of 1975 ($r=.67$, $p=.05$), and it was also responsive to NATO actions outside Vienna during this period ($r=.73$, $p=.03$). But the contrast between these two subperiods is even more dramatic than in the NATO case, because these same relationships became significantly inverse in rounds 8-19. Thus Warsaw Pact actions within Vienna were strongly opposite of their external actions from 1976 through 1979 ($r=-.58$, $p=.02$), and they were also negatively related to NATO behaviors towards them ($r=-.45$, $p=.07$) and to American behaviors towards the Soviet Union ($r=-.66$, $p=.01$). Thus in the latter periods of the negotiation the Warsaw Pact seemed to respond to growing conflict with more conciliatory moves in Vienna, and to relaxed tensions

with a more negative response in the force reduction talks.

When a multiple regression equation was computed relating Warsaw Pact negotiating behavior in all 19 rounds as the dependent variable with three independent variables, (NATO's negotiating behavior, NATO's external actions, and the Warsaw Pact's external behavior), no significant relationships were uncovered. As Table 7 reports, the overall multiple R was .33 ($p=.62$), and none of the independent variables made a significant contribution to the overall equation. Thus, with the exception of the result reported previously concerning correlations between Warsaw Pact behavior and NATO behavior in the previous negotiationg round, no variables included in our study seem to account consistently for the actions of the Warsaw Pact in these negotiations. As noted earlier, this may be a function of the extremely complicated and long lags that were probably involved in Warsaw Pact decision-making in connection with these negotiations, as well as by the reversal of relationships between earlier and later rounds of the Vienna talks.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

In summary, the analysis presented in this paper suggested several interesting conclusions about the relationships between East-West détente and bargaining within the Vienna force reduction negotiations. The most important conclusions may be summarized as follows:

1) There was a significant trend during the period from September 1973 through December 1979 for East-West détente to fade and for conflict to increase in interactions between the members of the two alliances. This was true for relations between both alliances as a whole and for relations between the two superpowers, though it was less evident in interactions

confined solely to the European continent. At the same time positions within Vienna negotiations, though they changed towards one another at various times, did not demonstrate a significant or consistent positive trend.

2) In external events the behaviors of the two alliances tended to mirror one another in an action-reaction pattern. There were significant correlations between behaviors of NATO and the Warsaw Pact towards one another, between the United States and the Soviet Union, and in mutual interactions between Eastern and Western Europe.

3) The behavior of allies in external events was often inconsistent. American and Western European behaviors towards the Warsaw Pact were largely unrelated, and Soviet and Eastern European behaviors towards the United States were also uncorrelated.

4) Within the Vienna negotiations there were few strong patterns of mutual reciprocity. While NATO and Warsaw Pact behaviors were responsive early in the negotiations, this pattern was reversed after 1975. However, there was some tendency for the Warsaw Pact to modify its behavior in the same direction as NATO subsequently in a lagged relationship, especially in the more recent stages of the negotiations.

5) NATO's behavior within the European force reduction talks was generally consistent with the behavior of Warsaw Pact nations towards the West outside negotiations, especially in the first 2-1/2 years. The mutual external relations between the two parties combined significantly accounted for NATO's actions within the Vienna talks.

6) The Warsaw Pact's behavior within these negotiations was generally consistent with the external behaviors of participating nations only during the first seven rounds of the negotiations. In more recent periods, the

Warsaw Pact's behavior was actually contradictory to the changes in external events.

Overall, the data presented in this paper suggest that détente has deteriorated significantly during the latter parts of this negotiation, and this seems to have generally had a deleterious effect on the Vienna negotiations. Not only has there been no strong positive trend within the negotiations, but the pattern of tightly related and responsive behaviors within the negotiations that was found in the early periods was broken in the latter period. First, patterns of mutual responsiveness among the parties in Vienna in the first seven rounds of the negotiation were replaced by inverse relationships in the next twelve rounds. Second, the strong positive linkages between external détente and internal cooperation found in the early periods were broken in the latter periods, resulting in either random interactions or negative relationships.

Thus, the results reported in this paper indicate that we are far from achieving the positively reinforcing cycle of political détente and and arms control that many national leaders spoke about in the early days of the Vienna negotiations. On the contrary, the negotiations seem to have been caught up in a negative spiral of mounting conflict, often characterized by stalemate or by apparent chaos in the negotiations. Positively reinforcing cycles that were found in the early stages of the negotiations have disappeared in the later ones. This would certainly seem to suggest that successful arms control negotiations are not likely to take place in an atmosphere of increasing hostility and conflict; rather the negotiation process seems to become far more fragmented under such conditions. Therefore, if we want to achieve successful outcomes in efforts to achieve arms control, greater efforts to reduce the cycle

of increasing tensions and mutual hostility and to restore the détente process between East and West are probable necessary. Only under such conditions is the present vicious cycle of escalating conflict and fragmented negotiation processes likely to be replaced by a more positively reinforcing cycle of political détente and progress in arms control negotiations.

TABLE 1: RAW DATA ON VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AND ON EAST-WEST EVENTS, September 1973-December 1979

Round, Date*		Vienna**		Events***									
		NATO	WP	NA-WP	WP-NA	US-SU	SU-US	WE-EE	EE-WE	US-EE	EE-US	SU-WE	WE-SU
1	1973 (C)	+6	+6	11.35	11.45	11.84	11.06	10.13	12.05	10.28	9.67	12.05	9.83
2	1974 (A)	-18	-18	11.66	12.07	11.70	12.24	11.84	12.65	12.13	9.89	11.78	9.83
3	1974 (B)	+3	-6	11.18	11.30	11.36	10.88	10.96	10.80	11.80	9.67	12.00	9.52
4	1974 (C)	+20	+17	10.74	10.62	11.07	10.94	10.67	10.85	9.48	9.24	10.48	10.06
5	1975 (A)	-3	-9	11.22	11.42	11.08	11.81	11.19	11.58	14.00	-----	10.20	9.45
6	1975 (B)	0	-3	11.06	11.08	11.58	11.52	10.76	10.93	11.28	9.33	11.19	9.44
7	1975 (C)	+13	-3	10.91	10.50	11.60	10.97	9.42	9.59	10.39	9.33	11.00	9.59
8	1976 (A)	-12	+4	12.44	12.27	13.17	12.98	9.82	11.82	14.67	-----	11.97	11.27
9	1976 (B)	-6	-3	12.33	12.17	12.63	12.18	13.60	11.56	-----	16.33	12.67	9.22
10	1976 (C)	-6	0	11.22	12.01	11.58	12.30	10.21	11.83	10.78	9.73	12.40	9.50
11	1977 (A)	-6	-6	13.45	13.51	13.06	12.36	14.05	15.00	14.75	-----	13.78	10.84
12	1977 (B)	-3	-3	12.92	12.76	12.92	12.73	11.54	12.00	13.00	10.00	13.72	10.33
13	1977 (C)	-6	-9	11.71	11.83	11.66	12.04	11.41	11.60	10.60	9.33	11.38	10.78
14	1978 (A)	+14	-3	13.41	13.42	13.04	13.04	14.79	14.98	9.84	10.00	13.35	9.00
15	1978 (B)	-18	+53	13.80	14.07	14.29	14.29	12.47	15.19	12.14	10.11	12.90	9.25
16	1978 (C)	+1	-6	12.48	12.73	12.17	12.69	14.07	12.22	11.00	9.67	14.21	10.00
17	1979 (A)	-3	-3	12.14	13.16	12.58	14.58	13.60	11.00	7.50	8.37	10.80	10.73
18	1979 (B)	-6	+1	11.76	11.88	12.16	12.21	12.25	11.50	11.00	13.00	11.14	10.00
19	1979 (C)	+42	-11	12.60	11.51	13.06	12.47	10.83	10.00	11.50	11.50	11.33	12.50
Mean		+0.63	-0.11	12.02	12.10	12.23	12.28	11.77	11.96	11.45	10.32	12.01	10.06
Standard Deviation		14.07	14.76	0.92	0.98	0.86	1.02	1.59	1.56	1.84	1.91	1.16	0.86
Correlation with Time: r=		.14	.11	.60	.54	.59	.68	.50	.16	-.19	.17	.25	.39
Significance: p =		.28	.33	.003	.009	.004	.001	.015	.25	.23	.26	.15	.05

KEY: *Dates are as follows: A=January-April; B=May-August; C-September-December.
**Net scores on position change in each round of the Vienna negotiations (see Appendix A)
***Mean scores on events scale from 1 (highest cooperation) to 30 (highest conflict); each column represents actions for the first party towards the second as follows: NA=NATO; WP=Warsaw Pact; US=United States; SU=Soviet Union; WE=Western Europe plus Canada in NATO; EE=Eastern Europe in Warsaw Pact.

TABLE 2: CORRELATIONS AMONG EVENTS DATA SCORES, September 1973-December 1979
(with significance levels in parentheses below)

	NATO-→WP	US-→USSR	US-→EE	WE-→USSR	WE-→EE	WP-→NATO	USSR-→US	USSR-→WE	EE-→US
US-→USSR	.93* (.001)								
US-→EE	.30 (.12)	.24 (.17)							
WE-→USSR	.19 (.22)	.26 (.15)	.16 (.26)						
WE-→EE	.66* (.001)	.44* (.03)	-.11 (.33)	-.15 (.27)					
WP-→NATO	.89* (.001)	.79* (.001)	.15 (.27)	-.01 (.49)	.73* (.001)				
USSR-→US	.73* (.001)	.76* (.001)	-.05 (.42)	.18 (.23)	.55* (.008)	.85* (.001)			
USSR-→WE	.70* (.001)	.54* (.008)	.29 (.13)	-.11 (.33)	.54* (.008)	.67* (.001)	.30 (.10)		
EE-→US	.21 (.21)	.26 (.17)	.40* (.07)	-.08 (.39)	.29 (.15)	.04 (.45)	-.02 (.47)	.15 (.30)	
EE-→WE	.75* (.001)	.59* (.004)	.30 (.11)	-.27 (.14)	.61* (.003)	.82* (.001)	.48* (.02)	.64* (.002)	-.01 (.48)

Key: NATO=North Atlantic Treaty Organization
WP=Warsaw Pact
US=United States
USSR=Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WE=Western Europe (NATO minus US)
EE=Eastern Europe (Warsaw Pact minus USSR)

* Correlation is significant at .10 level or better; precise significance levels are presented in parentheses below each Pearson Product Moment Correlation.

TABLE 3: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN POSITIONS WITHIN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS FOR NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT, Rounds 1-19

	1-19	1-9	8-19
Simultaneous:	r=-.19, p=.22	r=.88*, p=.004	r=-.48*, p=.06
Lag: NATO precedes Warsaw Pact:	r=.37*; p=.07	r=-.13, p=.41	r=.68*, p=.008
Lag: Warsaw Pact precedes NATO:	r=-.07, p=.39	r=-.42, p=.28	r=.05, p=.44

TABLE 4: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN NATO POSITIONS WITHIN VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AND EXTERNAL EVENTS

Events	1-19	1-7	8-19
NATO→WP:	r=.15, p=.27	r=.90*, p=.003	r=-.05, p=.44
US→USSR:	r=.13, p=.30	r=.33, p=.23	r=.01, p=.49
US→EE:	r=.34*, p=.09	r=.70*, p=.04	r=.21, p=.26
WE→USSR:	r=-.37, p=.06	r=.29, p=.27	r=-.50, p=.05
WE→EE:	r=.17, p=.24	r=.75*, p=.03	r=.35, p=.14
WP→NATO:	r=.44*, p=.03	r=.91*, p=.002	r=.37, p=.12
USSR→US:	r=.33*, p=.08	r=.88*, p=.005	r=.19, p=.27
USSR→WE:	r=.22, p=.18	r=.33, p=.23	r=.14, p=.34
EE→US:	r=.05, p=.43	r=.80*, p=.03	r=-.02, p=.47
EE→WE:	r=.43*, p=.03	r=.71*, p=.04	r=.35, p=.14

TABLE 5: MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF NATO POSITIONS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS

Independent Variables:	Simple r	Significance in equation (F)
Warsaw Pact in Vienna	-.19	.71
NATO→Warsaw Pact Events	.15	.01
Warsaw Pact→NATO Events	.44	.004

Multiple R = .68 R^2 = .47 F = 4.41 p = .02

TABLE 6: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN WARSAW PACT POSITIONS WITHIN VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AND EXTERNAL EVENTS

Events	1-19	1-9	8-19
WP→NATO	r=-.32, p=.09	r=.67*, p=.05	r=-.58, p=.02
USSR→US	r=-.32, p=.09	r=.75*, p=.03	r=.58, p=.02
USSR→WE	r=-.07, p=.38	r=.25, p=.30	r=-.08, p=.41
EE→US	r=.05, p=.42	r=.68*, p=.07	r=.07, p=.42
EE→WE	r=.-38, p=.05	r=.33, p=.23	r=-.52, p=.04
NATO→WP	r=-.29, p=.11	r=.73*, p=.03	r=-.45, p=.07
US→USSR	r=-.46, p=.03	r=.27, p=.28	r=-.66, p=.01
US→EE	r=.05, p=.42	r=.76*, p=.02	r=-.13, p=.35
WE→USSR	r=.26, p=.15	r=-.54, p=.10	r=.41*, p=.10
WE→EE	r=.03, p=.45	r=.51, p=.12	r=.04, p=.45

TABLE 7: MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF WARSAW PACT POSITIONS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS

Independent Variables:	Simple r	Significance in equation (F)
NATO in Vienna	.19	.71
NATO→Warsaw Pact Events	.29	.77
Warsaw Pact→NATO Events	.32	.91

Multiple R = .33 R^2 = .11 F = .61 p = .62

APPENDIX

Positions in Vienna Negotiations

ROUND I

West

+3	Initiative:	proposes common ceiling for ground forces of each side.
+3	Initiative:	proposes restrictions on the activities of military forces in the zone as stabilizing measures.
+3	Initiative:	propose first phase reductions by US and USSR only.
-3	Commitment:	Eventually the agreement must place some restrictions on forces in Hungary.
+6		

East

+3	Initiative:	proposes equal percentage reductions of more than 15% on each side.
+3	Initiative:	proposes reductions starting in 1975 and taking place over 3 years.
+3	Initiative:	proposes reductions in all military forces in the region.
+3	Initiative:	proposes that all 11 states participate equally (percentagewise) in the reductions.
-3	Commitment:	opposes Western proposal to reduce only US and USSR forces in the first phase.
-3	Commitment:	opposes NATO proposal to reduce only manpower.
+6		

ROUND II

West

-6	Rejection:	rejects contractualization of East-West disparity via equal percentage reductions.
-3	Commitment:	Hungary must be included in discussion of reductions.
-6	Rejection:	opposes inclusion of air and nuclear forces in an agreement.
-3	Commitment:	insists that an equal common ceiling is essential.
+6	Initiative:	proposes a two-phase reduction with US and USSR reducing in phase one and other participants reducing in phase two.
-3	Commitment:	insists on noncircumvention provisions to assure security of flank countries.
-3	Commitment:	measures that might be detrimental to Western European unification will be opposed.
-6	Rejection:	opposes reducing all countries' forces in all phases.
+6	Promise:	if first phase reductions go well, then NATO will continue to negotiate on second phase reductions.
-18		

East

-6 Rejection: rejects proposal for unequal reductions by the two sides reducing to a common ceiling.
-3 Commitment: reductions must include air forces and nuclear weapons.
-3 Commitment: refuses to negotiate on verification and control procedures until agreement is reached on fundamental questions of reductions.
-3 Commitment: refuses to discuss arms stationed in USSR.
-3 Commitment: all states much participate in the reductions, not just two.

-18

ROUND III

West

-3 Commitment: Western direct participants other than US will not reduce in phase one.
+3 Initiative: proposes some form of freeze on non-US Western participants after phase one.
-3 Commitment: reductions must be limited to ground forces.
+6 Promise: if agreement is reached on phasing, West will assume that second phase reduction by other direct participants will occur.

+3

East

-6 Rejection: rejects Western proposal for only US and USSR force reductions in phase one.

-6

ROUND IV

West

-3 Commitment: Negotiations focus on ground forces and do not include nuclear weapons.
+10 Accommodation: After phase one there will be a phase two agreement including all remaining non-US forces except Luxenburg.
+3 Initiative: A freeze will be imposed on increase in ground force between phases.
+10 Accommodation: Reductions would include air as well as ground personnel.

+20

East

-6	Rejection:	rejects Western approach because it does not deal with armament reductions.
+10	Accommodation:	agrees that US and USSR would make first and largest reductions in phase one in advance of reductions by other direct participants, 10,000 troops, 50% US & USSR, 25% Pol and FRG, all others 5%.
+10	Accommodation:	accepts agreement on phase one as a separate agreement contingent only on a clause calling for continuing negotiations on further reductions.
+3	Initiative:	proposes a freeze - none of the eleven participants would increase their manpower in the region during negotiations.
+17		

ROUND V

West

-3	Commitment:	first phase reductions should be made only by US and USSR
+3	Initiative:	proposes timing of second phase and commitment to undertake it if there is sufficient progress in phase one reductions.
-3	Commitment:	opposes freeze of current force balance by equal percentage reductions.
+3	Initiative:	the common ceiling should be collective.
-6	Rejection:	rejects national subceilings.
+3	Initiative:	proposes that US and USSR could not reintroduce withdrawn forces into the area to compensate for greater reductions by other parties.
-3		

East

-6	Rejection:	rejects proposed Western freeze of air forces and armaments.
+3	Initiative:	proposes an initial reduction of 20,000 men by 7 Western countries and 4 Eastern countries.
-6	Rejection:	rejects collective ceiling which would allow some countries to increase forces after agreement.
-9		

ROUND VI

West

+3	Initiative:	proposes measures to safeguard the security of flank countries, since they would not participate in reductions.
-3	Commitment:	data on force levels must be presented prior to agreement on a formula for force reductions.
0		

East

-6 Rejection: rejects two phase reduction proposal.
+3 Initiative: proposes new procedure for definitions of forces and counting rules.
-3

ROUND VII

West

+10 Accommodation: accepts some reductions of tanks and tactical nuclear warheads, (Option III, F-4 aircraft, and Pershing missiles) as part of a package reduction agreement; residual limits would also apply.
+3 Initiative: proposes reduction of one Soviet tank army (1,700 tanks) and 1,000 US tactical nuclear warheads.
+13

East

-3 Commitments: insists on prior agreement on reductions by all parties prior to reaching agreement.
+3 Initiative: proposes dividing armed forces into ground forces and air forces.
-3 Commitment: arms reduction must include air forces and delivery vehicle for nuclear weapons.
-3

ROUND VIII

West

-3 Commitment: armaments reductions in NATO proposal are a one-time offer that will not be repeated or increased.
+3 Initiative: proposes a common ceiling on air forces as well as ground forces with a combined total of 900,000 on each side.
-6 Rejection: rejects reductions by equal percentages on each side.
-6 Rejection: rejects Eastern phasing proposal because it requires all direct participants to undertake precise obligation regarding scope and timing of reductions.
-12

East

-6 Rejection: rejects Western force reduction proposal because of its linkage to the acceptance of the remainder of the West's reduction proposals, because it is one time offer limited to 2 nations only.

+10 Accommodation: agrees to a two stage reduction with only US and USSR reduction in the first phase.
+3 Initiative: proposes disbandonment of all forces withdrawn from reductions area to protect flank security.
-3 Commitment: insists that all components of armed forces should be reduced not just selected elements.
-3 Commitment: agreement in principle on reductions formulas must precede full data disclosure.
+3 Initiative: proposes freeze between two phases for Canadian and Western European troops in the reduction zone.
+4

ROUND IX

West

-6 Rejection: rejects Eastern proposal of round 9 on phasing because it fails to accept phased negotiations as well as phased
-6 reductions.

East

-3 Commitment: an agreement must guarantee that there will be second stage reductions in which each participant will contribute.
-3

ROUND X

West

-3 Commitment: national ceilings are unacceptable.
-3 Commitment: reductions must be specified in terms of the precise number of forces to be reduced.
-6

East

___ No moves
0

ROUND XI

West

-6 Rejection: rejects Warsaw Pact freeze proposal because it would contractualize, even if only temporarily, the existing
-6 disparity, and because of lack of data.

East

-3 Commitment: collective ceilings are clearly unacceptable.
-3 Commitment: current force equilibrium must be maintained at lower level of forces.
-6

ROUND XII

West

+3 Initiative: proposes that the data discussion should focus on US and USSR data and based on organizational structure of forces.
-6 Rejection: opposes data discussion on basis of national units.
-3

East

-6 Rejection: rejects reduction of Soviet tank army while West merely "thins out" U.S. soldiers from existing units.
+3 Initiative: proposes tabling data regarding size of national forces.
-3

ROUND XIII

West

-3 Commitments: must be specific limits on the number of US and Soviet manpower.
-3 Commitment: agreement must be reached on data prior to agreeing on reductions.
-6

East

-3 Commitment: opposes asymmetric reductions, with East taking greater reductions.
-3 Commitment: opposes consideration of Soviet forces stationed on Soviet territory.
+3 Initiative: proposes new format for data discussion.
-6 Rejection: rejects data discussion based on the organizational structure of the armed forces.
-9

ROUND XIV

West

+10 Accommodation: West will make commitments as part of a phase one agreement to the amount and timing of phase two reductions.
+10 Accommodation: Soviet tanks may be reduced on a divisional basis rather than on an entire tank army.
-3 Commitment: new initiative is contingent upon prior agreement on data.
-3 Commitment: any freeze must be taken as part of a first phase agreement and not be based on national ceilings.
+14

East

-3 Commitment: opposes asymmetrical reductions.

-3

ROUND XV

West

+6 Acceptance: accepts Eastern concession on the formula for parity.
-3 Commitment: insists that final agreement on parity depends on prior agreement on data.
-6 Rejection: rejects Eastern proposal on collective ceilings because it still retains elements of national ceilings.
-6 Rejection: rejects Eastern offer for amounts of Soviet forces withdrawn in phase one and Eastern manpower reductions in phase two.
-6 Rejection: rejects Eastern phasing proposal whereby USSR could nullify its phase on reductions if it is not satisfied with the phase two negotiations.
-3 Commitment: insists on Western approach to general collectivity of limits.
-18

East

+10 Accommodation: accepts notion that all states would reduce manpower and only US and USSR would reduce arms.
+10 Accommodation: agrees to common ceilings of 900,000 (700,000 ground) proposed of West.
+10 Accommodation: agrees to the principle of a collective ceiling.
+3 Initiative: proposes Warsaw Pact reduction of 105,000 and NATO of 91,000 based on official data, with US reducing 14,000 and USSR 30,000 in phase one.

+3 Initiative: proposes that USSR reduce 1,000 tanks and 250 mechanized combat vehicles, with maintenance of residual ceilings.
+3 Initiative: proposes limitations on post reduction increases.
+10 Accommodation: agrees to general commitments to a second stage reduction with details to be negotiated later.
-3 Commitment: that all states should reduce in proportion to their military potential in the region.
+10 Accommodation: agrees to only selective armaments reductions rather than across-the-board reductions.
-3 Committment: insist that all states must participate in phase two reductions.
+53

ROUND XVI

West

-6 Rejection: rejects Eastern proposal for proportional reduction commitments for all states in phase two as inconsistent with the principle of collectivity.
-6 Rejection: a collective freeze is not possible without prior agreement on data.
+3 Initiative: proposes data discussion based on specific force components to locate data discrepancy.
+10 Accommodation: indicates that all non-US Western direct participants will take a "significant share" of reductions.
+1

East

-3 Commitments: refuses for East to take proportionately greater reductions than West.
+3 Initiative: proposes a freeze on collective force levels during negotiations.
-6 Rejection: opposes Western European and Canadian commitments for phase two reductions as too vague, since no specific amounts of force reductions are proposed.
-6

ROUND XVII

West

+6 Acceptance: accepts Eastern acceptance of collectivity.
-3 Commitment: insists that implementation of collectivity principle requires prior agreement on data.
-3 Commitment: no form of national ceilings is acceptable.
-3 Commitment: cannot consider a freeze that would contractualize the existing imbalance.
-3

East

-3 Commitment: insists on the validity of Eastern data and the existence of approximate parity.

-3

ROUND XVIII

West

-6 Rejection: rejects new Eastern proposal on collectivity as essentially identical to June 1978 proposal.

-6

East

-3 Commitment: agreement on a maximum level of air force personnel is necessary.

-6 Rejection: rejects December 1978 Western proposal on commitments for phase two reductions as too general.

+10 Accommodation: agree that each alliance could determine the precise reduction of each participant under the collectivity

+1 principle and specific number need not be specified in advance.

ROUND XIX

West

-6 Rejection: rejects that unilateral Soviet withdrawal of tanks and troops from GDR has a bearing on the negotiations.

+10 Accommodation: proposes new figure for US and USSR phase one withdrawals at 30,000 for USSR and 13,000 for US, almost identical to those proposed by East.

+3 Initiative: proposes new measure to protect flank security.

-10 Retraction: withdraws proposals for armaments reduction by US in phase one.

+10 Accommodation: propose time limits of 3-4 years on phase one so that phase two would have to be implemented or phase one obligations would be terminated, thus giving assurance to East that there would be phase two reductions.

+3 Initiative: proposes associated measure for verification, including on site inspections.

+3 Initiative: proposes associated measures for announcement of out of garrison troop activites and invitation of observer.

+3 Initiative: proposes prior notification and verification of troop movements into and out of the reductions area.

+3 Initiative: proposes exchange of information about personnel strengths and organization of forces left in the reduction area as an associated measure.

+3 Initiative: proposes noninterference with national technical means of verification

+10 Accommodation: US will unilaterally withdraw 1,000 tactical nuclear warheads from the reduction zone.

+10 Accommodation: drops insistence on prior agreement on data for all Eastern countries prior to a phase one reduction; only needs agreement on US-USSR data.

+42

East

-6 Rejection: rejects Western proposal to reduce individual men rather than units.

+10 Accommodations: announces Soviet withdrawal unilaterally of 20,000 troops and 1,000 tanks from GDR.

-3 Commitment: all participants must agree to reduce.

-3 Commitment: all states must freeze between phases until conclusion of a phase two agreement.

-3 Commitment: reductions must include amounts.

-3 Commitment: air force personnel must be limited to 200,000 on each side.

-3 Commitment: verification measures must apply to all direct participants.

-11